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Abstract  The  paper  proposes  an  efﬁciency  criterion  for  evolving  economic  systems.  Drawing
on the  idea  that  these  systems  develop  from  the  interconnected  actions  of  intentional  creative
agents (which  invent  and  try  to  carry  out  action  plans),  the  suggested  criterion  at  a  micro  level
could be  state  as  follows:  a  system  is  efﬁcient  (from  a  micro  evolutionary  perspective)  if  agents’
intentional  and  hierarchical  (open)  goals  are  actualized  through  action.  Thus,  intentionality
leads to  facts  and  goals  are  reached.  The  evolutionary  efﬁciency  criterion  proposed  in  the
paper links  the  intended  goals  of  heterogeneous  agents  and  the  performance  of  the  system
they are  involved.







Eﬁciencia  evolutiva  en  los  sistemas  económicos:  una  propuesta
Resumen  En  este  trabajo  se  propone  un  criterio  de  eﬁciencia  para  los  sistemas  económicos
evolutivos.  Basándose  en  la  idea  de  que  estos  sistemas  se  desarrollan  a  partir  de  acciones
intencionales  desplegadas  por  parte  de  los  agentes  creativos  (que  inventan  los  planes  de  acción
y tratan  de  llevarlos  a  cabo),  el  criterio  sugerido  a  un  micro-nivel  podría  establecerse  como
sigue: un  sistema  es  eﬁciente  (desde  la  perspectiva  micro  evolutiva)  si  los  objetivos  (abiertos)Planes  de  acción;
Sistemas  económicos;
Eﬁciencia  evolutiva
intencionales  y  jerárquicos  de  los  agentes  se  materializan  a  través  de  la  acción.  El  criterio  de
eﬁciencia  evolutiva  propuesto  en  el  documento  vincula  los  objetivos  propuestos  por  los  agentes
heterogéneos  y  el  rendimiento  del  sistema  en  el  que  están  inmersos.
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he  difﬁculty  of  theorizing  from  the  normative  perspec-
ive  on  evolving  processes  is  a  present  issue  in  evolutionary




































































































conomics.  Over  thirty  years  ago,  Richard  Nelson  and  Sydney
inter  (1982)  raised  the  need  to  rethink  the  usual  crite-
ia  for  evaluating  the  efﬁciency  of  resource  allocations,
nalyzing  economic  systems  as  subject  to  processes  of  self-
ransformation.  As  the  authors  wrote,  ‘‘If  the  economic
orld  is  in  continuing  ﬂux,  as  our  positive  theory  sug-
ests  is  the  case,  the  normative  properties  associated  with
ompetitive  equilibrium  become  meaningless,  just  as  that
quilibrium  is  meaningless  as  a  description  of  behavior  [.  . .].
n  evolutionary  approach  to  positive  economics  thus  calls
or  a  complementary  rethinking  of  normative  economics  -
 difﬁcult  task’’  (Ibid:  356).  Additionally,  to  postulate  the
nvalidity  of  standard  static  welfare  criteria  for  evolution-
ry  analysis  of  economic  systems,  Nelson  and  Winter  (1982:
59--364)  criticized  the  inappropriate  use  of  the  fundamen-
al  theorems  of  welfare  economics  as  a  scientiﬁc  basis  for
omparing  the  performance  of  ‘‘market  economies’’  with
lternative  forms  of  social  organization.  According  to  these
uthors,  comparing  the  performance  and  viability  of  differ-
nt  forms  of  organization  requires  economic  activities1 other
han  those  used  by  standard  welfare  economics.  Nelson  and
inter  used  the  Mises-Hayek-Lange2 controversy  on  the  pos-
ibility  of  economic  calculation  in  socialist  economies  to
how  the  need  for  an  essentially  dynamic  and  evolving  regu-
atory  analysis  when  comparing  the  performance  of  different
conomic  systems.  Nelson  and  Winter  also  anticipated  the
ossibility  of  reinterpreting  market  failures  analyzed  by
eoclassical  economics  from  the  perspective  of  evolution-
ry  economics,  once  the  static  perspective  of  equilibrium
odels  is  modiﬁed  for  the  dynamic  study  of  economic  pro-
esses.  Thus,  the  types  of  normative  issues  that  arise  from
he  existence  of  monopolies  (in  the  case  of  evolutionary
odels  the  issue  is  not  one  of  existence  but  of  endoge-
ous  formation  of  monopolies)  in  a  static  framework  differ
rom  those  in  a  dynamic  framework  of  endogenous  self-
ransformation.
Externalities  can  also  be  observed  from  an  evolutionary
erspective,3 where  technical  change  and  transformation
f  the  structures  of  social  values  (in  processes  of  tech-
ological  and  institutional  co-evolution)  can  generate  new
eneﬁts  and/or  individual  and  social  costs.  The  implications
or  collective  action  mechanisms  and  criteria  that  agents
ust  establish  to  direct  their  actions  should  be  studied  in
heoretical  frameworks  in  which  it  is  possible  to  address
he  generation  of  novelty  in  economic  processes.  Only  this
ype  of  approach  might  capture  some  of  the  essential  points
hat  Nelson  and  Winter  anticipated  as  major  pitfalls  to
stablishing  normative  judgments  (necessary,  moreover,  for
1 ‘Here we simply note that evolutionary normative analysis
dheres naturally to a principle espoused by many economists
efore us: the most useful form of normative analysis is the detailed
omparison of relatively speciﬁc organizational alternatives. It is
ot helpful to compare the performance of real markets with that
f idealized central planners, or to compare the performance of
eal planners to that of idealized markets. It may be helpful, how-
ver, to consider at a relatively abstract level the kinds of policy
roblems that seem almost inevitably to arise in a political econ-
my that places heavy reliance on proﬁt-seeking ﬁrms and markets’
Ibid: 365).
2 Mises (1951), Lange (1938), and Hayek (1945).












olicy  making)  as  part  of  the  framework  of  an  evolutionary
pproach  to  economic  change.
Economic  change  implies  structural  change  in  that  it
nvolves  not  only  quantitative  but  also  qualitative  change
Saviotti  and  Pyka,  2004;  Saviotti,  2007).  The  qualitative
imension  is  closely  connected  to  the  process  of  innova-
ion,  the  introduction  of  ‘new’  and  the  withdrawal  of  ‘old’
conomic  activities.4 Structural  change  appears  when  nov-
lties  are  generated,  disseminated,  and  incorporated  in  the
conomic  system.  These  novelties  may  concern  inventions
technical  novelties)5 (Arthur,  2009),  institutional  change
Hodgson,  1988,  2006;  North,  2005),  new  rules  (Dopfer
nd  Potts,  2008;  Nelson  and  Sampat,  2001),  or  organiza-
ional  forms  (Penrose,  1959)  and  are  the  result  of  new
ombinations  (Loasby,  1999;  Potts,  2000). Continuous  gen-
ration,  dissemination,  and  retention  implies  continuous
hange  in  the  economic  system:  the  economy  is  a  complex
volving  system  (Foster,  2005;  Witt,  2003).  In  other  words,
conomists  need  to  explain  the  dynamic  processes  that  lead
o  the  emergence  of  orders  (Hayek,  1977,  1988)  or,  more
imply,  emergence  (Harper  and  Endres,  2012).6
Related  to  the  emergence  of  novelties  a  fundamen-
al  theoretical  problem  arises:  is  change  the  product  of
ntentional  actions  or  it  is  the  outcome  of  the  unintended
onsequences  of  an  action?  This  is  a complex  issue  with  many
spects  and  implications  affecting  concepts  from  theoretical
conomics  such  as  rationality.  For  an  action  to  be  rational  it
ust  be  intentional,  with  the  intentional  action  arising  from
omplex  interaction  processes  (Mun˜oz  et  al.,  2011;  Mun˜oz
nd  Encinar,  2014).
The  characterization  of  evolutionary  economic  processes
eads  to  the  essential  role  of  novelty  and  intentionality.
here  appears  to  be  broad  agreement  about  what  the  desir-
ble  properties  of  an  evolving  system  should  be  in  its  process
f  development:  generation  of  novelty  and  co-ordination.
or  the  system  as  a  whole,  Potts  (2000)  states  that  a  system
s  a set  of  constitutive  elements  (objects  such  as  knowledge,
gents,  institutions,  beliefs,  and  goals)  and  that  connections
mong  them  serve  a  common  purpose.  Such  a  structure  and
ts  evolution  support  the  analytical  description  of  dynamic
henomena.  In  this  way,  Metcalfe  (1995,  2003)  establishes
he  need  to  maintain  adaptive  processes  of  policy  making,
odgson  (1999)  proposes  an  evotopian  scheme  of  thought
bout  policy  issues,  and  Witt  (1996)  suggests  the  need  to
econcile  the  role  of  innovation  as  a  stimulus  for  economic
rogress  with  social  cohesion  (Pelikan,  2003).
The  crucial  questions  for  identifying  the  differences
cross  economic  systems  are  how  and  why  each  evolves.
 traditional  answer  involving  evolutionary  processes  con-
iders  the  way  dynamic  connections  are  formed.  The
haracteristic  evolutionary  processes  of  selection  and  reten-
ion  operate  on  this  basis  (Foster  and  Metcalfe,  2001).  In
his  context  is  important  to  judge  which  connections  are
ctivated  within  an  economic  system.  In  this  paper,  it  is
4 The quantitative dimension is inseparable from ongoing pro-
esses of structural change in the economy (Metcalfe et al., 2001).
5 For distinguishing between types of innovations, see Godin
2008).
6 Some emergent properties are development and innovation
















































nEvolutionary  efﬁciency  in  economic  systems  
proposed  that  coevolving  processes  result  from  the  dynamics
of  generation  and  connection  and  the  hierarchical  change  of
agents’  goals  as  they  are  linked  to  their  intentionality.  From
this  perspective,  and  by  means  of  the  analytical  concept  of
an  agent’s  action  plan,  it  is  possible  to  propose  an  evolu-
tionary  efﬁciency  criterion  in  economic  processes.7
The  argument  is  consistent  with  the  role  that  the  cate-
gories  of  intentionality,  such  as  belief,  goal,  intention,  and
collective  intentionality,  are  part  of  cognitive  sciences,  arti-
ﬁcial  intelligence  and  social  philosophy,  among  other  ﬁelds,
and  serve  as  the  explanation  of  individual  and  collective
behavior  and  the  emergence  of  institutions  (see  Baldwin
and  Baird,  2001;  Grosz  and  Hunsberger,  2006;  Metzinger
and  Gallese,  2003).  If  we  are  right,  this  proposal  would
contribute  to  the  microfoundations  of  economic  systems
concerning  agent  action,  which  results  in  individual  and
organizational  evolving  capabilities,  and  the  consequences
of  intentional  action  for  economic  change  (Felin  and  Foss,
2006;  Loasby,  2008).
The  following  section  presents  the  core  elements  of  the
analytical  framework,  which  lead  to  the  question  of  evo-
lutionary  efﬁciency  in  economic  systems.  In  this  context,
an  analytical  basis  for  an  evolutionary  efﬁciency  criterion
is  proposed.  Finally,  the  paper  addresses  other  ongoing
research  and  related  research  questions,  especially  those
that  explains  the  dynamic  performance  of  an  economic  sys-
tem  based  on  agents’  action  plans  interacting  within  that
system.
2. An analytical proposal for dealing with
evolutionary efﬁciency in economic systems
As  is  known,  the  traditional  Pareto  optimality  criterion
proposed  in  a  neo-walrasian  framework  for  analyzing  equi-
librium  states  denotes  that  these  states  show  efﬁciency,  in
Pareto’s  original  sense  (see  Pareto,  1981  [1909]:  VI,  §33).
Departing  from  a  conventional  microfoundation  (with  an
important  formalization,  (Arrow,  1951;  Arrow  and  Debreu,
1954;  Debreu,  1959)  that  was  based  on  the  axiomatic  ideas
of  consistent  preferences  and  complete  rationality  that
operates  on  a  set  of  information  that  includes  all  relevant
information  about  the  environment  and  the  assumption  that
agents  know  all  the  consequences  of  each  choice  (Simon,
1983).  This  view  argued  that  the  agents  would  allocate  their
resources  as  efﬁciently  as  possible.  For  these  choices  to
be  unequivocally  judged  more  efﬁcient  requires  not  only
that  agents  know  all  the  means  at  their  disposal  and  how
these  are  directed  to  the  objectives  (ends)  that  can  be
achieved,  but  also  the  exact  consequences  of  each  of  the
possible  alternatives.  This  is  possible  only  if  production  func-
tions  and  utility  functions  are  given,  or  if  they  are  known
a  priori.  Existence  of  equilibrium  is  thus  equivalent  to  the
logical  possibility  of  pre-reconcilable  choices  (Weintraub,
1979).  This  reduces  economic  processes  to  the  study  of  the
static  properties  of  equilibrium  states  resulting  from  mere
7 The concept of ‘dynamic efﬁciency’ proposed in Huerta de Soto
(2012) is conceptually different to the present proposal because of









arket  exchange.  The  applied  Pareto  efﬁciency  criterion
eems  unsuitable  for  evaluating  and  judging  evolutionary
conomic  processes  that  include  the  appearance  of  novelty.
hat  criterion  includes  no  reference  to  processes,  informa-
ion  requirements,  no  dynamism  (Pareto,  1909)  or  dynamism
hat  would  lead  to  the  search  for  and  realization  of  surplus
nder  the  assumptions  of  given  production  functions,  utility
ndexes,  and  homogeneous  agents  (Allais,  1981)  required  for
volutionary  economics.  Staveren  (2012:  110)  writes:  ‘‘(.  . .)
t  is  surprising  to  see  that  the  major  economic  evaluative  cri-
erion  of  neoclassical  economics  -Pareto  efﬁciency-  is  still
he  dominant  criterion  of  efﬁciency  in  most  of  economic
esearch.’’
The  analysis  of  evolutionary  processes  with  speciﬁc
icrofoundations  involving  heterogeneous  agents  in  a  world
f  bounded  rationality  and  imperfect  understanding  of  the
nvironment,  in  which  the  continuous  appearance  of  novelty
s  a  cause  and  a consequence  of  interactive  learning  pro-
esses  generating  emergent  properties,  is  not  analytically
ompatible  with  that  criterion  and  its  related  framework.
Contributions  to  normative  analysis  from  the  evolution-
ry  perspective  broadly  agree  about  the  desirable  properties
f  an  evolving  system:  generation  of  novelty  and  coordina-
ion.  The  criteria  that  aim  to  guide  policy  making  should
onsider  appropriating  the  production  of  novelty  that  is
erceived  as  beneﬁcial  because  it  expands  the  possibilities
f  action  for  agents  and  not  threatening  the  viability  of
he  system,  understood  as  the  possibility  of  economic  order
Nelson  and  Winter,  1982),  of  social  cohesion  (Witt,  1996,
003;  Lundvall,  1998;  Hodgson,  1999),  or  of  generation  of
ufﬁcient  variety  to  perpetuate  progress  (Metcalfe,  1995;
elikan,  2003).
Evolutionary  economics  searches  for  a  criterion  that
rings  together  the  capacity  to  generate  novelty  without  risk
f  coordination  and  continuity  of  the  ongoing  processes  of
conomic  development.  In  this  sense,  one  could  argue  that
 social  or  economic  system  evolves  following  a  progressive
rocess  of  development  if  it  is  able  to  generate  a  sufﬁcient
ow  of  novelties  to  expand  the  space  of  action8 of  agents
ithout  compromising  coordination  of  agents’  actions  and,
herefore,  the  viability  of  the  system  and  its  capacity  to
ontinue  producing  novelties.
Our  proposal  could  comprise  some  of  those  elements
eparting  from  microfoundations.  Let  us  pose  the  concept
f  an  action  plan.  An  action  plan  is  the  agent’s  projective
inkage  of  actions  (means)  to  goals.  It  is  a  system  in  which
ctions  and  goals  are  ordered  at  a  given  instant  in  time  in
 projective  manner.  Actions  and  goals  need  to  be  imag-
ned  before  they  are  deployed  by  agents.  The  set  of  actions
nd  goals  can  vary:  be  material  or  not;  be  located  at  any
oint  in  time;  able  to  be  expressed  in  monetary  terms  or
ot;  etc.  An  action  plan  is  therefore  a  general  open  struc-
ure  (Encinar  and  Mun˜oz,  2006).  We  acknowledge  that  an
ndividual’s  real  action  consists  of  planned  action  as  well  as
nplanned  action.  Unplanned  action  is  not  something  unim-
ortant,  residual,  or  trivial;  neither  is  it  fully  inaccessible
o  rational  knowledge.  Our  focus  here,  however,  is  on  the
8 For example in terms of: income, consumption, opportunities
f innovation, competitiveness, production capacity, ongoing pro-






























































































lanned  components  of  action  because  they  allow  us  to
ddress  analytically  the  activating  role  of  intentionality.
In  this  approach  it  is  relevant  to  focus  on  the  types  of  con-
ections  that  are  established  between:  the  means  (actions)
nd  the  goals  (objectives)  of  a  plan,  which  determine  the
rdering  of  connections  between  means  and  goals.  At  any
iven  time,  all  individuals  form  the  set  of  means  and  goals
s  each  are  perceived  by  those  individuals.  Thus,  if  it  were
ossible  to  deﬁne  at  least  two  alternative  plans  (combi-
ations  of  actions  and  objectives),  an  allocative  process
ould  be  speciﬁed  from  which  the  allocative  operation  itself
ould  take  place.  This  operation  allows  a  particular  per-
onal  action  plan  to  be  selected,  which  the  agent  will  then
ttempt  to  enact  on  their  physical  and  social  environment.
n  this  context,  economic  dynamics  may  be  understood  as
he  process  of  generation,  adoption,  and  attempted  inter-
ctive  deployment  of  the  agents’  action  plans  and  creation
f  the  resulting  ‘products’  (Rubio  de  Urquía,  2005).
At  each  instant  of  time,  an  action  plan  prospectively  con-
ects  elements  of  a  different  nature:  something  the  agent
ants  to  achieve  (goals)  with  the  actions  and  means  the
gent  ‘knows’  will  afford  him/her  success.  The  efﬁciency
riterion  agents  employ  in  practice  is  the  extent  to  which
hat  has  been  planned  is  being  executed  and  is  thus  produc-
ng  the  desired  goals.  Otherwise,  the  degree  of  unfeasibility
f  plans  is  a  proxy  measure  of  their  inefﬁciency.  As  a  conse-
uence,  agents  will  revise  parts  of  or  entire  plans  (or  even
iscard  and  replace  them  completely)  if  they  judge  the  plans
re  not  effective  enough.9
Agents  can  establish  new  connections  between  the  pre-
ious  elements  (actions/means)  or  with  entirely  new  ones,
hich  triggers  learning  processes  that  consist  of  reconﬁgur-
ng  mental  connections  and  exploration  of  adjacent  states  of
he  system  (individual  frameworks).10 In  our  approach,  the
rocess  of  the  dynamic  sequence  of  connections  between
eans/actions  and  goals  that  are  established  by  the  agents
hat  interact  within  an  economic  system  may  be  judged  in
erms  of  the  adequacy  of  connections.  Connections  between
ctions/means  and  goals  are  adequate  if  they  allow  the
rojected  actions  and  the  deployment  of  actions/means
o  produce  the  pursued  goals.  In  other  words,  connec-
ions  between  means/actions  and  goals  are  adequate  when
ntentions  (which  activate  and  change  as  new  goals  are  for-
ulated)  give  rise  to  actual  facts  as  expected.
We  can  now  pose  a  criterion  in  the  micro-level:  there
s  evolutionary  efﬁciency  within  an  economic  system  when
n  agent’s  intentionality  is  being  actualized  through  the
gent’s  actions.  Because  of  the  efﬁciency  of  the  connections
etween  means/actions  and  goals,  intentions  turn  out  to  be
9 ’Intentional’ changes in plans may be brought about not only by
ailure but also by success. The case in which an agent wants to
ake new plans after achieving success should also be considered.
xtra proﬁts may allow for extended search and hence favor changes
n plans. In other words, success leads to extra proﬁts that reduce
he opportunity costs for new changes.
10 From any starting position there are many adjacent states, and
hey may differ between individuals because their categories dif-
er; but any organization can tolerate only a limited amount of
ariety, because its coherence and stability relies on its members











acts  that  demonstrate  that  goals  are  being  produced.11 The
ulﬁllment  of  different  agents’  goals  and  the  compatibility
coordination)  of  their  plans  and  expectations  (Hayek,  1937:
7)  strengthen  the  (new)  connections  within  the  system.
This  criterion  could  be  applied  for  measuring  the  per-
ormance  of  a  system  because  it  is  relative  to  the  goals,
ntentions,  and  expectations  of  the  agents  involved  in  that
articular  economic  system.  The  basis  of  the  criterion  is
icro  and  the  effects  are  observable  at  the  meso-macro
evels  (Dopfer,  2008,  2011,  2013).
In  terms  of  the  criterion,  the  performance  of  an  economic
ystem  is:  (a)  high,  if  the  connections  within  that  system  are
dequate  insofar  as  they  cause  the  achievement  of  pursued
oals;  if  this  is  the  case,  we  say  that  the  system  is  evolution-
rily  efﬁcient,  or  (b)  low,  if  the  performance  results  from
nadequate  connections  that  do  not  lead  to  the  achieve-
ent  of  the  pursued  goals;  this  is  the  case  of  an  inefﬁcient
volutionary  system.
The  agent’s  action  plan  is  efﬁcient/inefﬁcient  a  priori  if
he  orderings  of  means/actions  achieve  the  desired  goals.  At
he  same  time,  efﬁciency  depends  on  the  absence/presence
f  logical  contradictions  or  impossibilities  among  the
ctions/means  to  goals  and  on  the  absence/presence  of
onﬂicting  goals.
If  this  formulation  means  that  the  agent/organization
s  capable  of  reaching  a  sufﬁcient  aspirational  level  of
atisfaction  regarding  its  main  goal,  we  can  say  that  the  con-
ections  between  means/actions  to  goals  are  efﬁcient  (from
he  point  of  view  of  the  agent)  ex-ante.  When  the  agents
nvolved  in  the  economic  system  formulate  internally  incon-
istent  plans,  they  actually  give  rise  to  inefﬁcient  action  in
he  meso  level  of  interaction.
. Ongoing research questions
rom  the  moment  in  which  we  assume  an  economic  agent
arries  out  his/her  action  in  an  environment  that  is  itself
hanging  and  evolving,  it  is  also  necessary  to  assume  that
n  economic  theory  that  explains  this  action  has  to  con-
emplate  the  intrinsic  dynamics  and  the  unfolding  of  the
ew  elements  that  are  generated  by  the  agent.  Does  this
rgument  require  all  agents  in  the  economic  system  to  per-
orm  well?  What  if  the  system  supports  the  fulﬁllment  of  the
oals  of  some  agents,  but  blocks  those  of  others?  What  if  one
gent’s  goal  is  to  block  the  development  of  the  system?  What
f  an  agent’s  goals  are  unrealistic?
An  internal  inconsistency  of  action  plans  in  an  economic
ystem  produces  a  rationing  of  goal  satisfaction,  generating
 worsening  of  the  efﬁciency  of  the  agents’  actions.  Thus,  a
ystem  (individuals,  organizations,  etc.)  as  a  whole  may  pro-
uce  lower  performance  in  terms  of  pursued  goals  (Geels,
004).
There  are  different  options  for  removing  the  source  of
ationing12 within  such  a  system:  agents  may  lower  their
xpectations  (reviewing  and  eventually  removing  some  of
11 Agents’ actions are both ‘effective’ and ‘efﬁcient’ (Barnard,
938).
12 A proposal for dealing with agents do not change their plans but
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their  goals);  adjust  their  actions/means  to  the  rationing;
review  the  content  and/or  the  hierarchy  of  their  goals;  aban-
don  some  of  their  goals;  change  the  institutional  setting;
and  perhaps  introduce  creative  responses  to  the  rationed
environment,  which  implies  shaping  the  whole  course  of
subsequent  events  (Schumpeter,  1947).  At  time  t +  1  the
structure  of  the  landscape  differs  from  time  t.  Thus,  an
improvement  in  the  efﬁciency  of  an  economic  system  would
require  the  revision  of  the  individual  (or  collective)  inten-
tionality  of  the  agents  involved  in  the  system.  Agents
pursuing  their  goals  may  or  may  not  reach  them.
The  underlying  evolutionary  processes  in  which  an  adap-
tive  policy  maker  could  monitor  and  guide  economic
progress  are  (a)  creative  processes  that  determine  the  range
of  available  innovations  and  new  options  in  any  moment  of
time  and  (b)  processes  that  link  the  unpredictable  emer-
gence  of  novelty  with  coherent  patterns  of  economic  and
social  change.  The  simultaneous  performance  of  such  pro-
cesses  in  evolving  systems  implies  the  need  to  ensure  an
adequate  institutional  design  and  a  network  of  connections
between  agents,  which  would  make  the  generation  of  vari-
ety  possible  through  organizing  knowledge  and  generating
novelties.  Policy  makers,  when  they  try  to  improve  the  per-
formance  of  an  evolutionary  economic  system,  should  take
into  account  how  and  why  actors  within  a  system  have  spe-
ciﬁc  goals  and  how  they  articulate  and  deploy  their  actions
to  reach  them.
Moreover,  since  agents’  goals  are  hierarchicalized,  and  it
is  (somehow)  illusory  thinking  that  all  goals  from  all  agents
may  be  reached  maybe  it  will  be  possible  to  re-deﬁne  the
criterion  by  considering  just  the  actualization  of  high  level
goals  from  the  individual  perspective.  This  analytical  way
(actualized  high  level  intentions  from  each  agent  perspec-
tive)  may  open  issues  that  the  proposed  criterion  leaves
unresolved  (mostly  at  a  meso-macro  level).
Summarizing  the  main  argument,  the  dynamic  action  of
agents  that  interact  within  an  economic  system  should  be
explained  in  relation  to  agents’  intentionality.  Otherwise,  it
is  not  possible  to  explain  the  products  (commodities,  tech-
nologies,  structures,  systems,  etc.)  and  categories  (value,
prices,  causality,  etc.)  of  action  other  than  using  self-
referencing  explanations,  which  are  not  explanations  by
means  of  microfoundations.  This  work  has  proposed  a  foun-
dation  for  explaining  the  performance  of  an  economic
system  based  on  agents’  action  plans  interacting  within  that
system.  The  evolutionary  efﬁciency  criterion  proposed  in
this  paper  links  the  intended  goals  of  heterogeneous  agents
and  the  performance  of  the  system  they  are  involved.
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